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Constitutionalism: A Critical Appreciation

and an Extension of the Political Theory
of C. H. McIlwain
Douglas Siurm*
I. INTRODUCTION
The reputation of constitutionalism has not remained unsullied over the past several decades for reasons both theoretical
and practical. For one thing, there has been a major shift in the
dominant concerns of political analysis in the West. Institutional
analysis has generally given way to behavioral analysis, and it is
now said that the real forces governing political processes are economic, social or even psychological. From this perspective,
laws and constitutions are not without some influence on patterns of human behavior, but they are basically pawns, exploited by and operating in the service of other more determinative factors of human intercourse. In this sense, constitutionalists are either hypocrites or, if sincere, miserably lacking
in realism.
For another thing, the political situation of the last 50 years
has led the man of practical politics to seek out alternatives to
constitutionalism. Constitutionalism, despite its long and venerable history, has been identified with the idea of a laissez faire
state, a state which governs best by governing least, by doing
only what is absolutely necessary to maintain peace and order
and by permitting wide scope to freedom of individual and
group action. But as such, so it is urged, constitutionalism cannot cope with the political needs of the twentieth century. The
twentieth century is a time of massive organization, big power
and complex technology which requires big government for the
sake of social control. It is a period in which national emergencies and problems of security are part of the normal course of
events. It is an epoch of social, economic and political development in which governments are called upon to use direct and
forceful means to manipulate, mold, transform and direct the
* Associate Professor of Religion and Political Science, Bucknell
University. This essay was prepared while the author was on a Postdoctoral Fellowship for Cross-Disciplinary Studies from the Society for
Religion in Higher Education. The author is indebted to Professor
William B. Gwyn who read and commented on the essay in its various
stages of development.
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energies and activities of the people. It is, in brief, an era in
which it seems necessary to press for centralization in government, for an increase in bureaucratic organization and control in public administration, for secrecy and security in governmental operation, for strength in positions of authority and obedience among the citizenry. It is not a time that can afford the
luxury of weak, constitutional government.
Despite these strong countervailing tendencies, however, constitutionalism has not been without its champions, as evidenced
in the writings of Carl Friedrich, Edward S. Corwin, Friedrich
A. Hayek and, the man with whom this essay is concerned, the
recently deceased Charles Howard McIlwain. Of course, these
writings might possibly be construed as anachronisms or as
the deathbed outbursts of an outmoded philosophy, except for
two factors: first, the very stature of these men as scholars
and theorists, and second, the fact that constitutionalism appears to be coming back into its own in some of the more
recent expressions of modern political analysis. So, for example, it has been employed as an ideal type (in a Weberian
sense) in empirical political theory;' it has been presented in
substance, if not in name, as the final stage in a theory of political
development; 2 and it has been proposed, again at least in substance, as of normative importance to contemporary political
construction.3
This essay is prompted by both of these factors. Its primary
purpose is to construct the basic form of C. H. Mcllwain's notion
of constitutionalism in its normative aspect, a dimension of his
thought that, apparently, has never been subjected to systematic
treatment either by Mcllwain himself or by anyone else. But
given his scholarly stature and his efforts to keep alive the idea
of constitutionalism while its reputation was being disparaged,
it is a dimension that deserves attention. In addition, given recent trends in modern political analysis, a second purpose of the
essay is to suggest a recasting and extension of McIlwain's notion
to increase its relevance to contemporary concerns and modes of
thought.

1. D.

APTER, THE POLITICS OF MODERNIZATION

(1965); J. NETL,

(1967).
2. G. ALMOND & G. POWELL, Jr., COMATIV-E PoITICS: A DEVELOPVENTAL APPROACH chs. X & XI (1966).
3. K. DEUTSCH, THE NERVES OF GOVERNMENT 254-56 (1966); W.
LEWIS, POUTICS IN WEST AFRICA (1965); VI. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISm
AND THE SEPARATION OF PowERs especially ch. XII (1967).
POLITICAL MOBILIZATION

19691

CONSTITUTIONALISM

Charles Howard Mcllwain was both historian and political
theorist. In his case this was a fruitful combination. He viewed
political realities and political conceptions within their actual

historical context and as having a past, present and future, and
yet he had a particular political focus, indeed an openly avowed
preferential bias, in his historical searchings. Thus while his
historical writings are careful, cautious and scholarly, they are
at the same time vigorous and lively at least partly because he
understood historical scholarship as having contemporary relevance. His research into the past was that of a man concerned
with the present. The issues of times gone were of crucial im-

portance because of problems of the present.
In political matters, Mcllwain was, of course, a constitutionalist. Constitutionalism was both the leitmotif of his historical
and theoretical studies and the object of his polemical writings. But constitutionalism was not, in Mcllwain's mind, a universal mental construct, a clear and distinct idea or a category
4
with definite and absolute perimeters. His 1938-39 lectures
and his classic work on political theory, The Growth of Political
Thought in the West (1932),5 are evidence that, to McIlwain,
constitutionalism is an historical conception; or, more accurately,
constitutionalism is itself a history, a developmental process.
Thus, to understand constitutionalism is to understand an
historical process, with all of the attendant difficulties and uncertainties.
To say that constitutionalism is an historical process is to
say that it is a style, a mode, a direction in the pattern of government. New times create the possibility for new insights into
and novel understandings of the meaning of constitutionalism.
Constitutionalism is a tradition in the proper meaning of that
term. It is not tradition in the sense of something fixed once
and for all in times past, to be retained in its pristine form, permitting of no change and not the slightest qualification. It
is rather tradition in the sense of a living, usable, adaptable heritage.
In this way constitutionalism is, perhaps not surprisingly,
comparable to the common law of the Anglo-American legal
tradition, at least as the common law has been conceived by the
jurist. The common law lawyer eschews black-letter law pre4.

C. MCILWAIN, CONSTITUTIONAISM:

ANCIENT AND MODERN

ed. 1947) [hereinafter cited as CAM].
5. C. McILwAIN, THE GRowTH OF POLITICAL THOUGHT
(1932) [hereinafter cited as GPT].

(Rev.

IN THE WEST
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cisely because he understands law to be a process. The attempt
to define the law or some area of the law once and for all is a
mistake, if not a subversion of the judicial process, for the content
of the common law grows and changes. The doctrine of
stare decisis, within this understanding, is a counsel of caution
and a principle of fairness and not an iron band of mechanical
jurisprudence. However, the factor of change and growth does
not mean that there is no reality or substance to common law.
It means only that the boundaries are fluid, not fixed; that definitions are pro tempore and not in aeternum. What the law
is cannot be said with perfect assurance a priori, for what it is
depends in part upon the peculiar circumstances of the instant
case. Thus, the search for certitude and predictability in common law is futile.
Constitutionalism as history and as tradition is much like the
common law, and new circumstances will require new formulations. That is why, given the spirit of McIlwain's approach, it
is valuable once again to inquire about the meaning of, and
justification for, constitutionalism in a time of radical political
change and acute political crisis.
But, if the meaning of constitutionalism changes and shifts
with the times, how is one to recognize it? Is the term empty,
purely formal, to be assigned any meaning one wishes? Is there
no constancy or continuity in its possible usage to make it useful for purposes of communication and :political construction?
As McIlwain employed the term, there is an essential core
of meaning, a dimension that persists through all the changes, a
minimal continuity that gives intelligible form to the tradition: "in all its successive phases, constitutionalism has one
essential quality: it is a legal limitation on government."' 6 The
key term, "limitation," recurred throughout McIlwain's writings.
Thus "[a]ll constitutional government is by definition limited
government."'7 And elsewhere, "[c]onstitutional government
is and must be 'limited government' if it is constitutional at all."8
Moreover, the limitation of government is a limitation by law.
The law establishes a line beyond which it is improper for
government to intrude. It circumscribes an area that is to be
free from governmental action. It establishes definite terms of
6. CAM, supra note 4, at 21.
7. Id.
8. C. McILwAmN, CoNsTITUTIONLISM ANDsmTHE CHANGING WORLD
244 (1939) [hereinafter cited as CCW]. This book is a collection of
essays published elsewhere during the year, 1913-37.
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proper political rule. But, it must be noted, the terms are
negative just as the core definition of constitutionalism is basically negative. The terms indicate not what government must do,
ought to do or may do. Instead, they indicate what government
may not do; they set the limit to governmental action.
At this level of definition, there is virtually no difference
between McIlwain and Friedrich, Corwin or Hayek. These four
theorists do differ significantly, however, on questions of which
economic structures and political forms are compatible with or
necessary to the fulfillment of constitutionalism. For example,
Hayek's argument that constitutionalism is clearly inconsistent
with socialism, the welfare state and the administrative state
is not shared by the other three. And McIlwain's strong reservations about the compatibility of constitutionalist government
with the doctrines of separation of powers and checks and balances are not found, at least in nearly the same degree, in the
writings of Corwin, Hayek or Friedrich. But on the most elemental level, all four understand constitutionalism as the antithesis of autocracy and tyranny and as consisting of effective
legal restraints on government action.
II. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF
CONSTITUTIONALISM
But this definition of constitutionalism as a legal limitation on government is a minimal one. The more complete outlines of McIlwain's conception emerge only after consideration of
those successive historical stages of constitutionalism that he
isolated and studied. It should be emphasized that the purpose
in characterizing these stages below is to isolate only what
appeared to be important to McIlwain. The actual historical or
logical adequacy of the delineation of each stage is relatively
unimportant.9 Whether Plato can indeed be interpreted as McIlwain interpreted him is much less significant here than the
interpretation itself. Thus, while I shall first set forth the gravamen of his five successive stages of constitutionalism, this is
only to provide the foundation. The outlines of McIlwain's own
normative conception of patterns of political existence may
thereafter be constructed.
9. Incidentally, Mcllwain observed that "[t]he history of constitutionalism remains to be written," (CAM, supra note 4, at vii), thus in
effect conceding the incompleteness and inadequacy of his own historical sketches.
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This procedure raises a host of methodological questions
about the relation of history and theory, fact and value, and the
like, whose consideration is out of place here given the limited
purposes of this essay. The procedure is adopted because it seems
to have been a basic assumption of McIlwain's work. That is, the
principles that informed his normative, constructive and polemical writings rest on historical bases. Whether the disproof
of an historical conception would perforce require an alteration
in normative stance is a nice puzzle, but a puzzle with which
McIlwain unfortunately did not deal. 10
A. ANciEiNT CoNsTUTIoN ASm
McIlwain used the term "ancient constitutionalism" to refer
variously to Platonic and Aristotelian, to Greek and Roman, and

exclusively to Roman conceptions of constitutionalism. For purposes of clarity, I am reserving the term to refer only to his
rendering of Plato's political thought. However, it is only with
some hesitation"- that McIlwain discovered a kind of constitutionalism in the works of Plato.
Plato was greatly concerned about the proper relation between government and law. His initial judgment, recorded in
the Republic, was to reject law and, therefore, to reject constitutional government. The reason is clear and has a familiar and
modern ring to it.
For laws by their definition are general rules: their generality
is at once their essence and their main defect, because generality

implies an average, and such rules can never meet the exceptions

that are always arising, as can the unfettered discretion of an
all-wise ruler. At best these rigid rules are a rough make-shift
far inferior to the flexibility of that wisdom which alone meets
the test of true justice, by rendering unerringly to every man

his due, not the
due of some "average man!' who never existed
nor can exist.' 2
Men differ, circumstances change, the actions of individuals and
societies are irregular. How can justice be done if a government
is constrained by laws, which by their very nature are general?
This is exactly the kind of question that led Locke to provide
for discretionary power in government. 3
10. A similar issue, formulated in terms of the relationship be-

tween faith and history, has been widely argued in the Western theo-

logical tradition. It is an issue that is crucial in any theology or theological ethics that is presumed to rest on a scriptural base.
11. See CCW, supra note 4, at 246-47.
12. GPT, supra note 5, at 27.
13. J. LocKE, THE SECOND TREATIsE ON CIVIL GovE hmXNT ch. XIV,
"On Prerogative" (T. Cook, ed. 1947).
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Even recently, a similar view provoked Samuel H. Beer,
a modern political scientist, to assert at the conclusion of a conference on "government under law" tLat rule of law imposes
the crude generalities of law upon this infinitely various, complex, shifting, changing, human material of society where each
individual is not a case under a general rule, no matter how
complicated you make the rule, but an individual.14
Thus Beer urged that rule of law be supplemented by "personalism," "meaning by this the existence of wide opportunities for
judgments which do not follow strictly from the existing rules,
but which serve justice by considering the exceptional circumstances."'
And it is the same basic judgment that permeates
Georg Cohen's thesis "that all real Law (wirkliche Recht) is
bound to the moment, and must result from a judgment on the
concrete situation, and cannot be found through analysis of one
or more laws (Gesetze), juristic concepts or principles."' 6
Thus, from a Platonic view, the perfect political order is that
in which an all-wise, all-good man makes decisions, formulates
policy and solves disputes by attending to the particular circumstances at hand, and thus he must be granted absolute discretionary power.
But, according to Mcllwain, Plato was abundantly aware of
the problems inherent in such a proposal. Where is one to find
an all-wise, all-good man? Who can be trusted to do justice in
every circumstance without any guidance save his own wisdom
and benevolence? What is to assure that discretion will always
be used for the common good of the society and the particular
good of the citizen? Under the authority of an all-wise man,
despotism-that is, rule by unhampered discretion-is the best
form of government. But in the absence of an all-wise man,
unlimited discretionary power would result in the worst possible
form of government. Thus Plato, according to Mcllwain, "while
admitting that the rule of law is inferior as an ideal to the unhampered justice of a true philosopher, is led to make it the
necessary basis of all good forms of actual government and by
its presence or absence to pronounce them good or bad." 17
While law, because of its generality and its rigidity, does not
yield perfect justice, it may nonetheless be an imitation of perfect
justice, and preferable to the sheer arbitrariness of ignorant and

14. Comment by S. Beer in GovER mNT
Sutherland ed. 1956).
15. Id. at 548.

16. G. CoHN,ExisTEmTaasus
17.

GPT, supra note 5, at 28.

UNDER

LAW 545, 549 (A.

ND RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT

5 (1955).
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vicious men. It is in this sense that Plato espouses a form of
constitutionalism as the only decent viable pattern of political
existence.
At this stage in Mdlwain's conception, constitutionalism
means government of law, or more precisely, government according to general rules that approximate some ideal of what is good
and proper. There are thus two forces of ancient constitutionalism: legal rules and moral ideals. The antithesis of ancient
constitutionalism as found in Plato is arbitrariness, absolute discretionary power and absence of standards.
But ancient constitutionalism is defective in three respects.
It fails to distinguish clearly between society and the state, so
that there is in principle no human activity that is beyond governmental rule. It fails to provide any remedy short of total revolution when government itself violates the rule of law. And its
standards of good government, even though they are a measure
of the relative worth of political forms, do not in themselves
possess the binding or obligatory character of law and are therefore ineffectual in disputing the legitimacy or authority of government.

B. RowAN CONSTrIUTIONALISm
To some extent these deficiencies are overcome in Roman
constitutionalism. The difference lies in the definition and the
implications of natural law. "True law," wrote Cicero, "is right
reason consonant with nature, diffused among all men, constant,
eternal."u s This means that the foundation and source of law
resides in the nature of things, and ;herefore in the nature of
mankind, for right reason is the constitutive principle of the
world as a whole and of the people in particular. Thus, to Gaius,
a lex "is what the people orders and has established."' 9 And the
state, as a bond of law, is a constructio: of the people. It is here,
in Mcllwain's judgment, that the nub of Roman constitutionalism
is found:
The central political principle of ... Roman jurisprudence is
* * . the doctrine that the people [are] the ultimate source of
all legitimate political authority in a state.[ 20] [And] the true
essence of Roman constitutionalism ... lie Es] in the ...
principle that the populus, and none but the
whole
populus,
can
be
2
the ultimate source of legal authority. 1
18.
19.
20.
21.

Quoted in GPT, supra note 5, at 111.
Quoted in CAM, supra note 4, at 44.
CAM, supra note 4, at 62.
Id. at 57.
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A radical distinction is here effected between fundamental
law and ordinary law. Fundamental law is an expression of
the consent, or at least consensus, of the people and is the source
of sovereignty-that is, the highest legal and political authority
within society. In one sense, sovereign authority is above the
law (Princepslegibus solutus est), but only in the sense that the
sovereign may create, alter or repeal ordinary law. The sovereign is at the same time subject to the law, since sovereignty is
constituted by fundamental law, and one who acts contrary to or
in violation of fundamental law cannot truly be sovereign. This
is the proper meaning of the maxim that the king can do no
wrong. 22 The point is that fundamental constitutional rules are

not subject to the will of the sovereign.
To McIlwain, this means that in the Roman conception of
constitutionalism there is a radical distinction between society
and the state. Society is the more inclusive category. Man, by
virtue of his nature and in his basic association with all men, is
more than a mere participant in a body politic and a subject of
political rule. Since he has the power of authority to create the
state, he is, in that sense, independent of the state.
Moreover, the Romans, in "undoubtedly one of their greatest
permanent contributions to constitutionalism," made a distinction "between the jus publicum and the jus privatum-a distinction that lies to this day behind the whole history of our legal
safeguards of the rights of the individual against encroachment
of government. '23 This distinction constitutes another level of
man's independence of the state. Public law (jus publicum) contains the rights and powers of the state as the body of citizens acting as a whole. Private law (jus privatum) contains the rights
and powers of citizens as individuals, thus delineating a sphere
not subject to governmental action. Both public and private law
have their origin in the people, both relate to the rights of the
people either as a whole or as individuals, and both contain
obligations and responsibilities that apply to the people. But the
distinction limits government in two ways. First, the legitimacy
of government rests on the consent of the people and depends
upon its conformity to fundamental law. Second, the scope of
governmental activity is limited by an area of law that protects
the interests and liberties of private individuals.
A final note McIlwain added to his sketch of Roman consti22. CCW, supra note 8, at 44.
23. CAM, supra note 4, at 46.
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tutionalism deals with the issue of discretion with which Plato
was concerned. Within the actual operation of Roman law, a
means of liberalization may be discerned by which the lines of
strict law or formal law were relaxed in order to take account of
the uniqueness of particular circumstances. The magistrates possessed the discretion (or the arbitrary authority) to invoke principles of equity as they saw fit in order that justice might be done,
even if this required contravening the letter of the law.
At this stage, therefore, constitutionalism means government
subordinate to and constituted by a fundamental law which consists of both public and private components and whose foundation is the consent of the people. It means as well a sensitive
administration of the law through magistrates who may use their
discretionary power to modify the rigidity of formal laws, but
only in order to realize the purposes of law. From the Roman
stage of the development of constitutionalism, the three factors
that are most important in Mcllwain's final construction are the
principle of consent, the notion of a fundamental law and the
distinction between jus publicum and Jus privatum.
C. MEDIEVAL CoNsTrrUoNALIsm
The heart of medieval constitutionalism is found in the concepts of government (gubernaculum) and law (jurisdictio), particularly as expressed by Bracton and later by Fortesque. Government, in brief, is a matter of prerogative. Acting on the basis
of his governmental authority, a monarch may do what he sees
fit. His discretionary power is complete. There is no legitimate
limit to what he may do. Within the sphere of government, he
has no superior and no standard to which he must conform.
But government is strictly qualified by its coexistence with
law (jurisdictio). In the medieval conception, jurisdictio meant
consuetudo, immemorial custom, the allegedly age-old expectations and habitual actions of the people. The king is not permitted to act outside the bounds of the law. It is positive,
coercive and not subject to the king's discretion. Laws appear
to be enacted, but enactment is only an explicit affirmation of
what already had the force of law in the customs of the people.
Moreover, binding enactment requires the participation of the
people affected by the law, for in medieval theory the Roman
maxim applies: what touches all must have the approval of all,
and what touches some must have the assent of those concerned.
Within this dyadic conception, the monarch was an absolute ruler
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only within the realm of government; he was at the same time
limited by the liberties of the people as incorporated in the "living
law" 24 of the society.
In general terms, some of the areas assigned to each category were clear. The maintenance of peace and the survival of
the realm were matters of the absolute authority of the king.25
On the other hand, the rights and liberties of property were matters of law. But, as might be expected, the line of demarcation
was far from clear. Indeed, McIlwain suggested it may be impossible "to set up permanent markers bounding the respective
fields of liberty and authority." 26 Certainly it must be acknowledged that the tension between these two spheres has not been
reduced in modem times. It in fact constitutes one of the major sources of contention in contemporary politics throughout
the world.
According to McIlwain, the major defect in medieval constitutionalism was the absence of any effective means of enforcing
the rights of the people against the arbitrary will of the ruler, or
even of deciding, in instances of dispute over the line of demarcation, which party was in the right. The only means of
maintaining the law were the coronation oath, excommunication
and "legalized rebellion" 2 7-but the success of these limited
means depended almost entirely on the good faith of the king
who might very well, if he possessed sufficient power, violate
his promises without apology, or might, if he wished to give
the appearance of acting properly, justify his action by an appeal to "reasons of state" or "national emergency."
D.

TRANsmoNAL PEIUOD

In Mcllwain's periodization of the stages of constitutionalism,
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in English history comprise a transition between the medieval and the modern conceptions of constitutional government. The transitional period is
crucial largely because English common law proved to be a
staunch defense against the attempts of government to eliminate the sphere of law (jurisdictio). This was, of course, the
24. E. EHRLIcH, THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLEs OF rTHE SOCIOLOGY
oF LAW 493 (W. Moll transl. 1936).
25. It is instructive to note that these responsibilities are still
assigned to executive office, accompanied with the same delegation of
wide discretionary power for their fulfillment.
26. GPT, supra note 5, at 370.
27. Id. at 371.
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age of absolutism and the divine right of kings. But the theory
and practice of English law continued to provide judicial mechanisms and legal procedures to protect the private rights of
the citizens against the acquisitive -designs of the king. Thus
the transitional period is important for its defensive character.
It was a strain merely to preserve the delicate balance of medieval
constitutionalism between gubernaculum and jurisdictio.
This is the period in which it became obvious that a king
was able to shrink the area of law by various appeals to
"reasons of state," "national emergency," "present or probable
dangers," and the most elemental requirement of the body
politic-survival. Constitutionally, there was no person and
no office to whom one could appeal ff he judged certain acts of
royal prerogative harsh, unjust or unwise. It was Philip Hunton's genius 28 to see that, given the prevailing form of constitu-

tionalism, there was no legal remedy against royal prerogative.
Admittedly, governmental action was in principle limited by
law, and in ordinary cases a government might be restrained by
"due process of law" in the courts, but there was nothing to prevent a government from justifying any action by appealing to the
absolute, unqualifiable, unconditional aspect of its authority.
The king has his reasons, so to say, of which law cannot know.
Constitutionally, the courts were stymied. Mcflwain repeatedly
asserted that the fundamental weakness of medieval constitutionalism was this lack of any means of enforcing the "legal
limits to arbitrary will."29 "Though he king was under the law
in theory," said McIlwain, "there was little effective machinery in existence to make this theory a practical reality." 0
This persistent pressure against encroachment upon the
rights of the Englishman as embedded in immemorial custom
provoked awareness of the need to provide a new dimension to
constitutionalism. And since there was, within the framework
of the constitution itself, no provision for constitutional change,
a revolution was required, a revolution in effect overturning, or
more accurately, transforming medieval constitutionalism. The
revolution was dehors the constitution, but for the sake of the con28. Philip Hunton is christened "a forgotten worthy" by Mclawain,
CCW, supra note 8, ch. IX, and subsequemt to Mellwain's rediscovery

of his genius, Hunton has been given his due by other historians of
political thought. See, e.g., M. JuDsoN, [tnE CPmsis or THE CoxsT=TEoN ch. 10 (1949).

29. CAM, supra note 4, at 91; cf. id. at 93.
30. GPT, supra note 5, at 197; cf. id. at 285 et seq.
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stitution. It was embarked upon as a means to create a new
and more effective form of constitutionalism, a form in which
legal procedures are augmented by political methods.
E. MoDmN CONSTITUTIONALIsm
McIlwain characterized modern constitutionalism as contributing both a legal and a political factor to the constitutional
tradition. The legal factor is the extension of the jurisdiction
of courts of law to include acts of government. The political
factor is the institutionalization of political responsibility in
the procedures of government. On the first point, the exercise of governmental prerogatives came under judicial review.
Ministers of the government became accountable at law, and
disputes over the legal propriety of governmental action became matters for the decision of the courts. Of course, this
accountability was rather flaccid so long as judicial appointments were held at the will of the sovereign. This is why
McIlwain considered the independence of the judiciary vital to
the effectiveness of legal remedies against government. That
independence was secured in England by the Act of Settlement
of 1701, according to which salaries of judges remained fixed and
tenure was held during "good behavior."
But even this, according to McIlwain, was not enough.3 '
Modern constitutionalism adds to the strictly legal protection of
the rights and liberties of the people a positive political control
of government, a means by which the people, through representatives, may "dismiss a minister merely because they disapproved
of his policies, without waiting for an actual breach of law or
inventing one."3 2 Although the concept of political responsibility is unique to modern constitutionalism, it in fact reincorporates a principle found in the constitutionalism of Rome:
In modern times, as in ancient [ie., Roman], governments are

generally limited practically in a much more positive way, by

the actual infusion of a popular element among the organs of
government themselves. In the middle ages, in short, government was limited, in modem times it is also controlled; and a
fruitful source of later constitutional struggles is to be found in
the attempt positively to prove or to disprove a traditional right
of control of government on the basis of medieval precedents
which themselves contemplate nothing beyond its limitation.33

Thus, in modern constitutionalism government is by the

31. CAM, supra note 4, at 133.
32.

Id.

33. GPT, supra note 5, at 362-63.
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people as well as for the people. An official organ is created
that is sensitive to the needs and interests of the people, and that
in response thereto maintains constant surveillance of and control over the ministers of state. But at one point Mcllwain more
modestly stressed that the principle of political control provides
simply a "means to make 'constitutional limitations' more practical and effective" so "[if] we have been able to improve on the
middle ages in political matters it is rather through the availability of more effective means; not the existence of nobler
ends."84
III. THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONALISM
There is nothing to be found in McIlwain's writings to indicate that he thought of modern constitutionalism as a fully adequate or sufficient stage in the growth and development of this
normative conception of political organization. Nonetheless, McIlwain did seem to think he had sketched the general outlines
of an intelligible pattern of government that, to his mind, was
the only proper, decent and humanly tolerable form of political
existence. Combining the minimal but essential definition of
constitutionalism as a "legal limitation on government" with
what Mclwain stressed in each of the stages in the development of constitutionalism, we can see perhaps five principles in
McIlwain's normative conception.

A. LAW
Constitutionalism is governmen;t, according to law. The
antithesis of constitutionalism is despotism-government that
is arbitrarily, without legal limitation. McIlwain distinguished
tyranny from despotism, for tyranny is found only where there
is law. That law, however, is ignored or violated without
good reason or proper authority. On the other hand, despotism
is not violation of law, for there is no law to violate. While
despotism is the antithesis of constitutionalism, tyranny is its
subversion by government. McIlwain conceived totalitarianismto
be a latter day form of despotism. It is rule according to will
and without law, and as such is the primary modern antagonist
of constitutionalism. McIlwain used the term autocracy to refer
to "unmixed" government, i.e. government without popular or
political control. Autocracy can be constitutional if limited and
34. Id. at 199-200.
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directed by law, tyrannical if it violates those limits and despotic or totalitarian if without any legal restraint.

B. POPULAR CONSENT
Constitutionalismis government according to a fundamental
law that expresses the consent of the people. This is one of
the strands that is woven through McIlwain's controversial
but stimulating "constitutional interpretation" of the American
Revolution.3 5 Here again I avoid the ticklish question of the
historical accuracy of McIlwain's work. But it is my firm
impression that in his interpretation of both the English and
the American revolutions, the principle of consent as the
proper foundation of government and law is crucial, and this
appears to echo a fundamental motif of both Roman and medieval
constitutionalism. Thus:
[I]t is significant that Cicero's state is founded in consent, and
that this, to be effective, must be the consent of the whole
people (populus), a theory which formed the central principle
of the Roman republican constitution and survived the establishrnent of practical despotism in the Empire to pass into the
common thought of Europe in later centuries. 36
And subsequently, in medieval theory, it was held that "'what
touches all should be approved by all.' And what touches all
7
is the law common to all."
To McIlwain, the terms revolutionary and constitutional are
mutually exclusive. 33
But what is first revolutionary, because an attempt to overthrow the existing fundamental law,
may become constitutional once the people affected acquiesce,
because consent is the basis of legitimacy of fundamental
or constitutional law.31 Much of McIlwain's argument rests on
the question of whether the people in the American colonies
consented to the constitutional principles in Great Britain that
resulted from the English Revolution of 1688-89. Whether or not
McIlwain's answer to that question is tenable, it does seem clear
that in his understanding of constitutionalism, consent of the
people is the ultimate source of the authority and the legitimacy
35. C. McILwAr,

THE AimVERicAx REVOLUTION (1923)

[hereinafter

cited as AR].

36. GPT, supra note 5, at 117.
37.

CCW, supra note 8, at 145.

38. AR, supra note 35, at 1.
39. It might be instructive to compare McIlwain's notion of consent with Hart's notion of acceptance as related to the "internal aspect
of law" in H. HART, TnE CONCEPT OF LAw (1961).
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of fundamental law and of government, even if it is not clear
in McIlwain's writings what constitutes consent or how consent
is registered.
McIlwain's definition of sovereignty rests on this principle
of consent. -Supremacy means actual control of a people and
as such commands obedience. But whether a supreme power
is sovereign depends upon the presence of, and conformity
to, fundamental law. Thus, sovereignty is legal power or
authority; it is, by definition, legally right.40 The fundamental
law that determines who is sovereign is "a set of rules not
made by the sovereign authority subsisting under that constitution, nor subject to his will." 41 It is, rather, created by the
people.
To McIlwain this does not entail the notion of "popular
sovereignty." Popular sovereignty would mean that the people and the government were one and the same. But since ultimately there are no legal limits on the people, and since sovereignty means lawful authority, popular sovereignty seems to
McIlwain a contradiction in terms.42 Moreover, since
the people is not sovereign; the government is, [then if] the
people set up a sovereign government, they must in their own
interest also set up or keep up all the necessary barriers against
its despotic action, and the only 43effective barrier short of actual
resistance is the barrier of law.

That leads us to the third component of Mcllwain's conception
of constitutionalism.
C.

DisTIcoNI

BETWEEN PUBLIC AN) :PRivATE LAW

Constitutionalismis government according to a fundamental
law in which there is a reasonably precise distinction between
public and private law, or between the scope of governmental authority and the rights and liberties of the people who are subject
to that authority. The line between public and private may be
difficult to draw; in fact, its location may quite properly vary
from time to time. In an observation strikingly appropriate today, McIlwain noted that
[C]onstitutional history is usually tlie record of a series of
oscillations. At one time private right is the chief concern of
the citizens; at another the prevention of disorder that threatens
to become anarchy ... [W]hen the rights of government are
40.
41.
42.
43.

See CCW, supra note 8, chs. II, IE: & IV.
CCW, supra note 8, at 279.
Id. at 291.
Id. at 264.
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unduly stressed, the rights of individuals are often threatened;
when the latter are44overemphasized, government becomes too
weak to keep order.
Indeed, "the preservation of the delicate balance between order
and liberty" is still "the most pressing problem of modern government."

45

Despite the difficulty, the fulcrum must be located and its
location must assure both an effective government and the preservation of the rights of the individual. To discuss the latter
point first, what are the rights and liberties that ought to be
incorporated in the fundamental law? Although the answer to
this rather important question is not fully explicated in McIlwain's writings, he did assert that
[we] must retain those legal limits of governmental action which
now exist in our bills of rights to protect the personal as well
as the proprietary rights of the humblest and even the most
hated of our citizens. Not only must we retain them; we must
revive and revise, we must clarify and even extend them, for
only so can we ever hope to give permanence to our needed reforms themselves. If they are to last, these reforms must have
a better guarantee than the passing whim of any dictator; and
the only guarantee that men have ever been able to devise,
short of actual
physical force, is the guarantee of constitutional
limitations. 46
Among the personal and proprietary rights and the institutional means of protecting those rights that McIlwain listed as
the "hard-won gains" of constitutionalism against despotism are
"[jiuries not answerable for their verdicts, writs of habeas
corpus, the condemnation of ex post facto laws, judges with independent tenure, strict definitions of treason, rigid enforcement
of the rights of accused persons."'4 In addition, Mcllwain referred to the freedoms of thought and expression, and of immunity for accused persons, and the right to be free from arbitrary
detention and from cruel and abusive treatment as illustrative
of "all the rights of personality we hold dearest."48 These, he
noted, are threatened whenever "reasons of state" are invoked
and deemed a proper basis for "prosecution ex officio mero, secret, arbitrary and irresponsible." 49 This, of course, is another
expression of the dynamic tension and persistent struggle between gubernaculumand jurisdictio.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

CAM, supra note 4, at 136.
CCW, supra note 8, at 277; cf. CAM, supra note 4, at 139.
CCW, supra note 8, at 290.
Id. at 273.
CAM, supra note 4, at 139-40.
Id. at 140.
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It might be argued that to MeIlwain the rights of the individual that are most crucial and that should without question
be cast into a formal bill of rights as part of fundamental law
are procedural in character. So, at any rate, might one construe his statement that "[c] onstitutionalism is more a method
than a principle. It is the method of law as contrasted with
force and with will."5 0
Yet McIlwain did not contend that all rights once formalized in a written constitution or bill of rights are sacred, inalienable and unqualifiable. Consider, for example, his scattered comments on the right to property. On the one hand, the right to
individual property "played a great part in earlier contests
with a doctrine of the divine right of kings which placed both
subjects and their goods at the absolute disposal of their sovereign." 51 Indeed, property laws constituted the bulk of jurisdictio in English common law and comprised the dominant lever
of the people against the king. On the other hand, McIlwain
referred to "[t]he questionable way in which the same arguments have sometimes been used in our day [1923] to defend
all vested interests and the deserved contempt into which they
have fallen. 5 2 Fourteen years later, he returned to this theme
in attacking "psuedoliberalism," which he defined as sheer individualism, as the advocacy of "the extreme doctrine of laissez
faire, surely one of the strangest fan'tasies that ever discredited
human reason. '53 Psuedoliberals exploit constitutional guarantees for "the selfish interests of the few," neglecting the fact
that constitutionalism means guaranteeing the rights of all.
They do so by sanctifying the right of property and by relying
on an "unhistorical definition" of the right of contract to justify
the exclusion of all other rights. Repudiating the Roman law
definition of contract, the psuedoliberals oppose all state interference in the formation of contractual relations. Thus "there is
little or no safeguard for the weak against the strong; protection
of the public against an adulterated product would be unthinkable." McIlwain rendered the harsh judgment that "[f] ew illusions have been more disastrous than the one arising from an
uncritical acceptance of Sir Henry Maine's sweeping generalization that human progress has been a development from status
to contract."5 4
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

CCW, supra note 8, at 290.
AR, supra note 35, at 161.
Id.
CCW, supra note 8, at 286.
Id. at 287.
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This scathing denouncement of the psuedoliberals and
their selfish drive to protect the "sacred right of property" was
written in 1937, the year of President Franklin Roosevelt's
"court-packing plan," which was designed to overcome the Supreme Court's rejection of the social reforms of the New Deal.
Mc~lwain thought it crucial to the preservation and healthy existence of constitutionalism both to maintain the integrity and
independence of the courts and to strive for effective government and social reform. However, in his critical discussion of the
psuedoliberals (who in that day had the constitution on their
side), McIlwain acknowledged the agonizing difficulty of sustaining both goals. Thus, "the surest safeguard of a proper
balance between the jurisdictio and the gubernaculum ...
would seem to consist in ... [a] constitution containing ... [a]

distribution" of various political matters and activities, classifying some as legal rights of the people and leaving others to the
free discretion of government. But as Mcllwain's statements
on the rights of property and contract illustrate, "the distribution
of these matters ... is ... in constant need of revision by inter-

pretation or by amendment."

Moreover, with reference to the

American constitution he averred that "it may . . .be that the

mode of that amendment is somewhat too slow and cumbersome
for the best interests of all."55 At the same time, constitutional
laws are meant to be fundamental "not merely because they are
basic, but because they are also unalterable by ordinary legal
processes."'' 0 The conclusion is that change in the fundamental
law should be more difficult in some sense than change in ordinary law, but not so difficult that revisions cannot be made when
necessary to re-establish the precise balance between rights of
individuals and prerogatives of government.
Whether the fundamental law should be written (or the extent to which there should be an attempt to make it explicit in
writing) depends upon the durability and depth of the traditions and customs of a country. To Mclwain, the only reason
that the principle of the omnipotence of Parliament has been unchallenged is that its edge has "been blunted by conventions
whose operation has been practically as invariable as that of the
law itself. '5 7 But he warned:
As the restraining influence of tradition grows weaker, the
55. CAM, supra note 4, at 145.
56. Id. at 21.

57. Id. at 18.
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danger of a tyranny of the majority comes nearer, and the time
may arrive when convention must give way to law if the rights
of minorities are to be respected and. safeguarded as they have
been in the past. A popular despotism must result if the omnipotence58of parliament ever becomes in practice what it now is
in law.

D.

JUDICIAL REVIEW BY INDEPENDENT COURTS

Constitutionalismis government in which a legal method is
incorporatedto ensure the rights and iiberties of the people. That
legal method which ensures the people's rights and liberties is
judicial review by an independent judiciary. Thus McIlwain
wrote that the only means by which a constitutional system can
endure is "a judicial review which makes sure that no act of the
'sovereign' shall exceed the legal authority conferred upon it by
the people in the constituent law, or constitution."5 9 Elsewhere
he insisted that the "chief reliance" against the "insidious encroachments of despotism" is "a fearless and impartial interpretation of law by a free and independent judiciary." 60
At first blush, it might appear that Mc~lwain was guilty of
a chauvinistic or parochial exaltation of a uniquely American
institution, and an institution that was produced by judicial
fiat at that.6 1 But McIlwain himself insisted that judicial review is not an American invention, but existed in the legal
traditions of France and England. ]ndeed, it "is really as old
as constitutionalism itself, and without it constitutionalism could
'62
never have been maintained.
Judicial review involves three factors-"first, that there is a
fundamental constitution [whether written or not]; second, that
its interpretation rests with the judiciary; and third, that judges
have an authority only, in the words of Lord Bacon, 'to interpret Law, and not to Make Law, or Give Law.' "63 Regarding
the last of these three factors, it is difficult to imagine that
Mcllwain was unaware of the problems of judicial interpretation
and the virtual inevitability of some degree of judicial creativity.
But his insistence that proper judicial behavior requires the
declaration of law and not the creation of new law is an understandable reaction in light of the way in which the Nazis were
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id. at 20.
CCW, supra note 8, at 291.
Id. at 282.
See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. ,1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
CCW, supra note 8, at 278.
Id. at 278-79.
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abusing the legal process. 4 This situation also led him to be
somewhat critical of sociological jurisprudence. Presumably he
feared that justification might be found to soften the legal structures and to subordinate legal principles to "social needs" and
"political ideals." The end result of such a trend could only be
sheer despotism and, with Plato, McIlwain doubted that any
man could be trusted to use despotic power wisely for the genuine
good of all men.6 5
To restate McIlwain's point, constitutionalism does not in itself entail rigidity, social backwardness and resistance to change
and economic reform. It does entail a disciplined adherence
to methods and procedures that will support and advance
the rights of people, and this means guarding against the
erosion of legal and judicial processes. Thus "[o]ur problem
to-day, in a word, is to make needed changes in the laws, but
always to keep them law." 66 In fact, reforms are not only
needed in and for the sake of social and economic order, but are
needed in the judicial process as well since "it is far too slow
and cumbersome." 67 But whatever changes and reforms are
effected, the courts must be kept free from governmental control and the institution of judicial review must be maintained.
E.

GovmRTiENTAL RESPONSIBILITY AND PoPuLAR CONTROL

Constitutionalism is a government in which a political
method is incorporated which will result in effective rule but
also maintain popular control over governmental officials. In
McIlwain's constitutionalism there are two methods for setting the line of demarcation between the public and the private
spheres and thereby shielding the liberties and rights of men
against arbitrary government. The first is the method of legal
limitation analyzed above. The second is the method of political

responsibility which conjoins governmental effectiveness and
popular control.
It is in this connection that McIlwain's disdain for the doc64. See id. at 268 et seq.

65. McIlwain justified the notorious Schechter case on exactly
these grounds. He understood the case to illustrate that even Supreme
Court justices with liberal sympathies in social and economic policy
properly felt bound to maintain strict adherence to law and to declare
any legislative action invalid if unconstitutional. See Schechter Poultry
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
66. CCW, supra note 8, at 282.
67. CAM, supra note 4, at 141.
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trines and institutions of separation of powers and checks and
balances must be seen, for he contended that political responsibility was "utterly incompatible with any extended system of
checks and balances," and he generally identified checks and
balances with separation of powers.68 He did assert that the principle of separation of powers is "valid and necessary if restricted so as to mean merely the independence of the judiciary," 69 but when extended so that it permeates the legislative and executive spheres of the governmental process it leads
to corruption and constitutes an open invitation to despotism
and perhaps revolution.
His supportive argument involved a manifest rejection of the
"legislative struggle" pattern that characterizes the American
lawmaking process. McIlwain apparently interpreted the doctrines of separation of powers and checks and balances as meaning a governmental system in which there are multiple and overlapping circles of power and a diversity of competing semiautonomous groups, formal and informal, all involved in the
legislative and administrative process, and each playing some decisive role in the formation and implementation of policies.
Thus, no single identifiable group is responsible for the results
and the inability to fix responsibility "has fostered the growth
of 'pressure groups', with all their attendant corruption" and
"has led to 'log-rolling' and every other form of crooked politics;
for under any system of balances run wild the result is sure to
be government for private interests or groups instead of government for the whole people.17 0 The failure to be able to
precisely locate the responsibility of legislative action leads as
well to the absurdity of "one branch. of ... government, under
pressure from a selfish minority, passing a bill they know to be
vicious in the secret hope that another branch may nullify their
action."'1 Consequently, within such a system, much legislation
and administration tends to favor special interest groups and to
68. CAM, supra note 4, at 142. For two studies which view the
separation of powers and checks and balances as two quite different
mechanisms of government, see W. GwYN, THE MEAmNG OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS (Tulane Studies in Political Science, vol. IX 1965) and
M. VILE, CONsTrnuTIoNALIsm mN THE STIARATIoN OF POWERS (1967).
69. CCW, supra note 8, at 282.
70. CAM, supra note 4, at 143. While McIllwain's position on interest and pressure groups was typical of the time, the emergence of

the group theory of politics, stimulated particularly by D. TRumAN,
THE GOVERNmENTAL PROCESS (1951), completely altered the interpretation of the significance of interest groups in politics.
71. CCW, supra note 8, at 281.
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grant special privileges; bills that are originally designed to
serve the public interest are twisted and compromised into irrelevancy; needed reforms are avoided; the effectiveness of government is stymied.
Mcflwain asserted that the feebleness of government is one
of the major causes of both the modern rejection of constitutionalism and the related "tidal wave of despotism" that was
sweeping the world in 1937.72 The reasoning is that people become weary of awaiting social and economic reform; resistance
to existing injustices and dissatisfaction with governmental inaction increases; the sluggishness of governmental processes is
ascribed to their constitutional form; and people are led to seek
the quick and seemingly easy solution of strong, arbitrary government, unhampered by law. But, Mcllwain rejoined, sluggishness and corruption in government cannot be ascribed to constitutionalism per se, but rather, at least in part, to separation of
powers and checks and balances. The proper alternative to sluggishness and corruption is responsible government-a solution
which is not at all incompatible with constitutionalism.
Responsible government requires power; more precisely, it
requires concentrated, centralized power. When the power of
formulating and administering public policies is concentrated in
the hands of an identifiable group of public servants, then responsibility may be clearly fixed. And, of course, with the
same concentration of power, governmental action is also more
effective, prompt and decisive, and social and economic reform
is not impeded by the compromises of a system in which power
is diffused and responsibility dissipated.
When viewed in isolation, concentration of political power
and centralization of political responsibility may seem to imply
arbitrariness in government and an excessive extension of the
prerogatives of the gubernaculum.73 These are indeed the implications of the doctrine of the omnipotence of Parliament as understood by Mcllwain. But when centralization is set within
the context of constitutionalism, judicial review and popular control take on significant roles. The courts can assess the validity
of governmental action relative to the fundamental law, which
should incorporate the rights and liberties of the individual person. And governmental officials are held accountable to the
72. Id. at 257.

73. "[D]emocratic government must have something of the
strength, the decision, and the independence that a dictator enjoys" in
order to serve the vital necessities of the people. Id. at 281.
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people, subject to removal from office if a certain proportion of
the people are displeased with their policies. In this way, the
responsibility of government is 4directed to the people--"and to
'7
all the people, and at all times.
Of governments that approach this constitutional ideal of
responsibility, Mcllwain names parliamentary government as
"probably the most developed form of representative institutions now known; in advance even of the 'presidential' form
evolved ... in America." 75 He most likely had the British
cabinet system in mind, for he asserted that no one who knows it
"would venture to say that it is a system of checks and balances,
and what little check survived to the beginning of this century
was in large part swept away by the Parliamentary Act of 1911
in taking from the Lords the legal right permanently to block
an action of the cabinet approved by the House of Commons." 76
On the other hand, the United States Constitution would have
to be amended to approach the constitutionalist ideal of responsibility; it would have to shed its system of checks and balances
to provide for the "legal means of securing what men believe
77
that justice demands" in a modern industrial society.

This view was expressed during the constitutional crisis of
1937:
Anyone interested in the constitutional guarantees of religious
belief, free speech, immunity from arbitrary arrest or imprisonment, to mention no more, must be alarmed by any proposal
that might touch these guarantees; and the liberal most of all.
The long painful history of the securing of these safeguards ought
to make him of all men most fearful of any proposal that could
enfeeble them. He should be afraid that any judge compliant
enough to read into our constitution a beneficial power patently
not there, might at another time be compliant enough to read out
of it any or all of these guarantees of his liberty which are there;
for a judge willing to take orders from a benevolent despot
might be equally subservient to a malevolent one .... [T~he
liberal ... ought to strive for the maintenance of an effective
judicial review by an independent judiciary. This is the lesson
of the whole history of modem constitutionalism ....

If so,

let us forget our little differences and unite to get our needed
reforms by constitutional means. Let us remember that to
have our rights defined by existing law not by "healthy public
74. CAM, supra note 4, at 144.
75. A.R, supra note 35, at 57.
76. CCW, supra note 8, at 257. Mclwain's idealization of parliamentary government was widely shared at the time. For a recent study
rejecting this characterization, see S. BEE, MoDEn BmarisH Ponimcs:
A STUDY OF PAR=S AND PRESSURE GRouPs (1965).
77. CCW, supra note 8, at 281.
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sentiment" [78] is far more important for us than the temporary
prejudices of one or two judges, or even the temporary postponement of some much needed reforms. If we can get these
reforms in this way, we shall know when we have them; they
will not be dependent on the changing whims of any duce or
fuhrer. There are undoubtedly strong arguments for improving9 our judiciary, but these are not arguments for weakening
it.7

Unfortunately, Mcliwain apparently did not provide any full
analysis of the issue to which he is referring. Indeed, it might be
pointed out that the proposals for the change in the Court were
fully within the constitutional powers of Congress.
Moreover, Mcllwain quite properly seemed to admit that the
"prejudices" of some of the Supreme Court justices were actually
influential in obstructing social reforms even though they attempted to hide the fact of prejudice by the invocation of
constitutional grounds. But if in fact prejudices of judges
do play a decisive role in the judicial process, what are the
implications for constitutionalism? How are the "integrity"
and "independence" of the court to be maintained? As early
as 1912, McIlwain affirmed his disbelief in the recall of
judges.80 But then why was the Roosevelt proposal of 1937
not a serious attempt to effect constitutional change in the judicial system precisely in order to make the way clear for social
reform and to maintain the institution of judicial review-and
all that without removing the existing forms of popular control of governmental officials? McIlwain obviously thought the
proposal ill-advised, but one can only speculate about the exact
course of his reasoning. Indeed, as he noted in the same address
from which the long citation above comes: "You may come to
particular conclusions far different from mine on this fundamental issue of the court. That is not the important matter. It
is that you should care and should think about it."81 Perhaps
McIlwain saw the possibility of reasoned arguments on both sides
of the proposal, and his overriding concern was not so much that
the court not be altered in size or transformed for a time in its
character by new appointments as that there be a deliberate
attempt to preserve the principles and institutions necessary to
constitutionalism through all efforts at social and economic reform, even efforts requiring constitutional change.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Mcllwain here alludes to a statement by a Nazi official.
CCW, supra note 8, at 264-65.
Id. at 294.
Id. at 265.
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A PROPOSED EXTENSION: AFFIRMATIVE
CONSTITUTIONALISM

Thus, in sum, there are five principles that fill out the minimal definition of constitutionalism as "legal limitations on government"-the principles of law, popular consent, the distinction
between public and private law, judicial review by independent
courts, and governmental responsibility and popular control. In
each of these five areas, however, McIlwain left unresolved and
unanswered issues and questions that should be dealt with in
any fully adequate and operational definition of constitutionalism as a normative category in political theory.
First, what exactly does the term 'qaw"mean? If constitutionalism is the rule of law, does this mean the rule of Recht,
Droit, or merely rule according to Gesetz, loi? Are law and discretion always incompatible? If not, should the use of discretionary power nonetheless be controlled? If it should be controlled, by whom, how and according Io what principles?
Second, what does "consent" mean? How does it differ, if
at all, from obedience, acquiescence, deliberate acceptance or
approval? What is the justification for the principle of consent?
How may the principle of consent be given practical political
effect and expression? Is it ever possible for the consensus of a
people to be wrong, evil or incorrect?
Third, what principles, if any, should guide a people in deciding where to draw the line between public and private in
varying circumstances? Are any rights "inalienable" or even
"preferable?" Is there a specifically constitutionalist "reason of
state?" Are all rights expendable when the issue of the survival
of body politic is at stake?
Fourth, on what grounds, if any, can judges be trusted more
than legislators, administrators or the people generally to preserve the fundamental law? Are cultural, psychological, social
and economic factors equally as important as legal institutions in
the maintenance of a constitutionalist pattern of politics? Is
judicial creativity always undesirable? Is it unavoidable? If
it is unavoidable, what principles, if any, should guide a court's
decisions?
Fifth, is there a variety of ways to institutionalize popular
control? What is the meaning of "representation" in political
organization? Do the people ever have the right to revolt? Do
separation of powers and checks and balances necessarily result in irresponsible and ineffective action? Are there forms of
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informal, social checks and balances that may in fact help maintain constitutionalism?
Moreover, there are two major issues completely neglected
in McIlwain's writings: first, what is the economic, social, psychological and cultural side of constitutionalism; second, why is
constitutionalism desirable? The first is an issue that pertains to
the behavioral sciences, a primary focal point in modem political
analysis. The second, a question of justification, is an issue that
pertains to moral philosophy, which in turn relates to the normative aspect of political theory.
All told, McIlwain's normative conception of constitutionalism is not only exceedingly general, but also basically negative.
The fundamental assertion underlying the entire conception is
that whatever a government is and whatever a government
does, it ought not to meddle in all aspects of the lives of the
people; there ought to be institutions especially designed to
assure, so far as possible, the maintenance of distance between
government and the individual.
However, there is a positive side to this assertion which, if
explicitly formulated and fully developed, might constitute a
response to the question of justification and a basis for solving
some of the issues unresolved in McIlwain's conception. I suggest this positive side, or "affirmative constitutionalism,"8 2 as a
sixth principle and as perhaps an emerging stage in the development of constitutionalism.
Constitutionalism is the type of government that provides
possibilities for the active participation of all citizens in the
continuing process of communal decision-making and goal-attainment. The reason for considering this principle the positive side
of McIlwain's negative assertion is related to the manner in
which the rights of the individual actually function when effective in the political process. These rights-such as the right
to freedom of expression through all media of communication, the right of free association, the right of assembly-are
indeed negative in the sense that they specify limits to the
legislative and administrative powers of government. At the
same time, however, they are positive in the sense that by limiting government they protect means whereby the people may
82. The term "Affirmative Constitutionalism" was inspired by the
title of Charles E. Wyzanski's excellent paper, Constitutionalism: Limitation and Affirmation, which is published in GovERNi rT

at 473 (A. Sutherland ed. 1956).
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dissent from or support it, but in any event may actively and
continually participate in it.
Thus, the image of the fundamental law of constitutionalism
as a barrier or a boundary line is perhaps less appropriate than
its image as a channel or a conveyance. The fundamental law
limits in order to enable; it limits the powers of government
for the purpose of maintaining a form of government in which,
and through which, all the people are enabled to act.
Thus, it is possible to conceive of government not only as a
potential enemy of the people (although, to be sure, it is that),
but as an instrument of the people. There is no denying the
evils and injustices effected by past and present governments,
even governments that presume and pretend to be constitutionalist, and it would be foolhardy not to expect similar experiences
of a profoundly tragic character in the future. But constitutionalism is a normative conception; it is intended to be an
image of the proper form of government and a basis for evaluating existing forms. And as such it conceives of government as
a means of communal creativity, as a mechanism for social planning and social action, and as a positive force for coordinating
human efforts in the attainment of social goals.
Underlying this principle, as I conceive it, is an understand-

ing of the human person, both individually and communally, as
most essentially creative freedom. According to this understanding, there is an open-endedness to man; he is incomplete, and by
virtue of what he decides and what he does, he continually makes
and remakes himself. He is in a constant process of becoming.
Thus, we speak of man as an historical being. And, I emphasize,
this open-endedness and historical essence is true of man both
individually and communally. It is, of course, possible to treat
persons or groups of persons in a more or less nonhuman manner,
in a manner that stifles or minimizes the possibilities of their
creative action or their participation in communal action. But
from this perspective, such a manner of treatment is to deny or
to violate man's humanity.
The rights, procedures and institutions of constitutionalism
are intended to give expression to man's creative freedom. They
are designed to give consideration to all citizens as human persons in the process of social decision-making. The concept of the
rights of the human person has been extended by the United
Nations Declaration of the Rights of Man, the European Charter
of Rights, and the various declarations of the meaning of Rule
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of Law by the International Commission of Jurists. The extensions include economic, social and cultural rights as well as
political, religious and intellectual rights. They are an effort
to indicate what is necessary to realize affirmative constitutionalism, for, it is said, without certain economic and cultural
resources, all the proclaimed political rights in the world are
not worth a tuppence.
Liberty has long been the fundamental purpose and value
of constitutionalism. In affirmative constitutionalism, the centrality of creative freedom, both for the individual and the
community, is a point of continuity with the past. But the
difference is marked, for creative freedom is not simply freedom from government, but freedom expressed in and through
government. This motif is in keeping with an age where government has assumed a major role in social, economic and
cultural development, in stimulating and directing forces of mobilization and modernization. It is in keeping with the cry of
minority groups and deprived peoples for participation in political processes. And it is in keeping with a form of thought
that is emerging dominant in the minds of many men, a form in
which process and relation are key categories. Consequently,
affirmative constitutionalism is an attempt to conjoin an old but
developing tradition with a new historical situation, and to do
so in such a way that man's humanity, conceived as creative
freedom, has opportunity for its fullest expression in the sphere
of politics.
I do not pretend that the principle of affirmative constitutionalism provides answers to all of the questions listed above,
but I do assert that it provides a possible and fruitful base for
their consideration. It might, for example, be considered the
fundamental substance of law, (as Recht or Droit) in the notion
of "rule of law"; it might provide a justification for the principle
of consent and may be of assistance in deciding what particular
rights are to be preferred in cases of conflict; and it might
offer both a principle to guide judges and administrators in
the use of discretionary power and a measure of evaluating
the relative propriety of revolutionary movements. These
and other issues remain to be fully explored.8 3 At this point
I merely wish to propose that the principle of affirmative constitutionalism may indicate a direction for their exploration.
83. Many of these issues, of course, have been explored at some
length in the writings of Carl Joachim Friedrich.
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V. CONCLUSION
In effect, McIlwain seems to have understood constitutionalism throughout its development as a humanistic, or in more
modern parlance, a personalistic doctrine of law and politics.
The proposed extension of his conception is an effort to retain
this perspective, and to urge that, in the midst of political revolution, social unrest, economic change and international conflict,
the common man have a rightful role in the processes which
make decisions and effect policies. Further, it is to urge that, if
political and legal institutions are in some respects epiphenomenal, the proper conclusion is not that constitutionalism is
irrelevant or unrealistic, but that the basic perspectives and
principles of constitutionalism should be brought to bear on
whatever realities-social, economic, psychological or culturaldo in fact determine the communal fortunes of mankind.

